Tada! It's fixed... right?

So here it is, Searle's about to complete the impossible, he's going to reconcile dualism and materialism, two sects that are completely at odds. So let's get right down to it.

Searle asks us to forget history, forget context and try to re-examine the facts. Honestly a very good idea, let's get all the crap and bullshit out of the way. So, after doing that, we take a look at what we know: science and physics appear to be a closed system of cause and effect and this can explain everything in the world, we have subjective first person qualitative perspective it is undeniable, therefore this subjective first person qualitative perspective is a part of the physical natural world. Appeals to common sense eh?

Ultimately his conclusion can be stated as simply as: consciousness is causally reducible, but ontologically non-reducible. So let's clarify what reduction means. So say we wanted to do a reduction on my desk, we can reduce the desk to the molecules and forces that make up the desk, so it really isn't a desk, what it really is is molecules and forces. It only exists as it is because we designate it that way (i.e. a desk, something to put my computer on), but we can describe it by the smaller things that make it up, it is reducible.

Now what's the difference between a a causal reduction and an ontological one right? Well causally means we can reduce something to the points in history that have brought what we are describing to the point where it is. For example, evolution and genes become a causal reduction of species and organisms.

An ontological reduction is more like my reduction of the desk. Ontology is the study of the nature of existence, so an ontological reduction is a reduction of its substance or existence. But it can be more complicated than just the molecules in the desk. For example what you see on the computer screen can be ontologically reduced to the software processing in your computer.

Basically for everything in physical science, it can be reduced causally and ontologically. If you find one the other isn't far behind. In some cases they could even seem one in the same, like the cause of the desk is the ever present forces of the molecules of wood, and ontologically the desk is the forces and molecules of wood.

Well what Searle's trying to say is, that consciousness is the exception. It can be reduced causally, but not ontologically. So let's give examples. We've (or at least I've) already come to terms with the fact that it deffinitely is not ontologically reducible. For we cannot see inside anyone else's experience. There is no way to tell what is going on in someone's first person, you only have what they tell you, but for you that's always third person knowledge. Therefore consciousness' existence is not reducible to physical properties that make it up.

But Searle claims that consciousness can be explained as caused by the brain. So that consciousness is a process of the brain, just not an ontologically reducible process. It can be explained by the brain functions that cause it to happen. And in this he says that arguments like the philosophical zombies, that are identical to us in every physical manner but have no consciousness, though abstractly conceivable, are not physically possible. If they were an exact physical replica, they would necessarily be conscious, even though consciousness is not reducible to smaller physical parts itself. The key he says, is to discard the historical perspective on it and redefine what we think of as the closed loop of physics so that it can include consciousness and it's interesting nature.

So, I think that's about as clear as I can make his argument. I hope it's clear enough for all of you reading it.

Anyway, there are deffinitely appealing things about the theory I think, i.e. the appeal to common sense. The idea that since consciousness exists it would make a lot more sense as part of the closed loop of physics than it would as this random outside attachment looking in that seems to have nothing at all to do with the physical world. However, I think there are some issues with the argument.

My main problem with it is I think it's really a form of ignoring the hard problem of consciousness. It's how I think Searle thinks it should work, and how he wants it to work, but there's a lot of internal wierdness to it. It still doesn't explain how something could be ontologically irreducible in a physical world. Instead it's more like "consiousness is, physics is, I'm tired of it, let's work it in together some how and worry about other stuff, and stop worrying about this problem that refuses to go away!" He wants so badly to be able to explain consciousness biologically and physiologically, but he can really only go so far.

Unfortunately he's really managed to solve nothing, although I'll give him props for putting more effort in than Dan Dennett, who pretty much rejects the idea of consciousness altogether. It's a valiant effort, but even property dualists believe that consciousness is a natural thing. I don't think Searle is even bringing anything new to the table to be honest. It's kind of like he's saying "consciousness is not reducible physically? No big deal!" Basically just accepting consciousness and moving on to brain science. While I think that's totally viable for say a scientist to say, as a philosopher, I don't think he's digging deep enough.

We'll see though, he's got more coming, including arguments about free will and stuff, so maybe that will make his argument stronger. He does say he believes consciousness has a causal role in the world though I'm not sure how. Deffinitely looking forward to that, certainly more to come.